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INTRODUCTION 
The law of political economy is a contentious ideological field characterised by antagonistic 
relations between scholarly positions which tend to be either affirmative or critical of 
capitalist modes of economic reproduction. Going beyond this schism, two particular features 
appear as central to the law of political economy: the first one is the way in which it 
epistemologically seeks to handle the distinction between holism and differentiation, i.e., the 
extent to which it sees society as a singular whole which is larger than its parts, or, rather, as 
a mere collection of parts. Different types of legal and political economy scholarship have 
given different types of answers to this question. A third way has, moreover, emerged 
through an understanding of the law of political economy as being aimed at simultaneously 
separating and re-connecting political and economic processes in a manner which goes 
beyond the holism versus differentiation schism. The second feature of the law of political 
economy is the way in which it conceives of the relation between hierarchical and 
spontaneous dimensions of society, i.e., between firms and the market, or between public 
institutions and public opinion. Also in this regard, competing approaches exist, just as the 
relation has been handled in radically differently ways within corporatist, neo-corporatist and 
governance-based institutional set-ups of political economy.
1
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I.  THE MULTIPLE DISCOURSES ON LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Political economy themes have - directly and indirectly - been a central concern of law and 
legal scholarship ever since political economy emerged as a concept in the early seventeenth 
century,
2
 a development which was re-inforced by the emergence of political economy as an 
independent area of scholarly enquiry in the eighteenth century, as developed by the French 
physiocrats. This is not surprising in so far as the core institutions of the economy and 
economic exchanges, such as property and contract, are legal institutions.
3
 In spite of this 
intrinsic link, political economy discourses and legal discourses dealing with political 
economy themes unfold in a largely separate manner. Indeed, this book is also a reflection of 
this, in so far as its core concern is how the law and legal scholarship conceive of and 
approach political economy issues. The focus is, in other words, on how law and legal 
scholarship internally re-construct issues of political economy, and not on the political 
economy as such. 
One reason for the relative estrangement between law and political economy might be 
found in the basic assumptions and focus of the dominant schools of political economy. As an 
ideologically contentious scholarly field, political economy tends, as mentioned, to be 
divided into approaches which are either affirmative or critical of capitalist modes of 
economic reproduction. 
On the affirmative side, public and social choice stand out as umbrella terms for 
approaches which seek to transpose economic tools and perspectives, such as those derived 
from utility maximisation and game theory, into issue areas that are traditionally dealt with 
by public law and political science, i.e., how individual decisions aggregate into collective 
decisions, and issues of individual, as well as social, optimisation of welfare.
4
 New Public 
Management might be seen here as a related approach which seeks to develop “business-like” 
forms of organisation and management in the public sector, for example, through the 
                                                 
2
  Antoine de Montchrestien, Traicté de l’oeconomie politique, edited by François Billacois, (Geneva: Librairie 
Droz, [1615] 1999). 
3
  For illustrations of this, see, for example, Simon Deakin, David Gindis, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Kainan 
Huang and Katharina Pistor, “Legal Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law”, (2017) 
45 Journal of Comparative Economics, 188-200; David Kennedy, A World of Struggle. How Power, Law 
and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
4
  See, for example, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations 
of Constitutional Democracy, (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1962); James D. Gwartney and 
Richard E. Wagner (eds), Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1988). 
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introduction of quasi markets.
5
 These approaches tend - implicitly or explicitly - to be 
combined with normative undertakings aimed at expanding an economistic way of observing 
and evaluating social phenomena in areas of society not previously dominated by economic 
logics, thereby producing performative effects. 
Critical political economy and associated left-Hegelian and Marxist-inspired 
approaches, on the other hand, have served as alternative ways of observing economic 
processes, essentially advocating the task of critical political economy as exposing the 
perceived inadequacies and simplifications of the basic concepts of mainstream economics, 
and engaging in the development of a conceptual framework capable of taking better account 
of the wider societal effects of economic reproduction.
6
 
This divide between affirmative and critical approaches is furthermore based upon 
different methodological points of departure. Public and social choice and positive political 
economy in general depart from a methodological individualist perspective, maintaining 
individuals as their focal point. Critical political economy and Marxist-inspired approaches, 
on the other hand, tend to emphasise methodological collectivism, focusing on groups and 
structures, rather than on individual preferences. In this divide, rational institutionalism and 
Varieties of Capitalism might be seen as seeking to bridge the gap between left and right, 
thereby departing from a “centre-left position” while the section of positive economics which 
acknowledges the self-interest of the state and other collective formations, might be seen as 
engaged in the same exercise departing from a “centre-right” position.
7
 
In spite of the different points of departure, the various positions tend implicitly to 
share a number of assumptions. Firstly, the primacy of the economy in so far as both the 
affirmative and critical approaches tend to see the economy as the central driver of societal 
evolution, with the in-built logics of profit generation, welfare maximisation, and creative 
destruction embedded in economic processes as the fuel. This is also the case for those which 
explicitly seek to highlight the role of the state or the structural demand for a societal 
embeddedness of economic production processes, in so far as they tend to invoke the notion 
of capitalism, understood as an overarching process which integrates economic and political 
                                                 
5
  Gernod Gruening, “Origin and Theoretical Basis of New Public Management”, (2001) 4 International 
Public Management Journal, 1-25. 
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  For an overview, see Gary Browning and Andrew Kilmister, Critical and Post-Critical Political Economy, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). 
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  For positive economics, see Steven G. Medema, The Hesitant Hand: Taming Self-interest in the History of 
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Poul F. Kjaer 
 4
logics, thereby making it difficult to separate the political and economic dimensions of 
capitalist reproduction.
8
 
Within legal discourse, a similar divide can be observed between the largely German 
ordoliberal school and the largely American law and economics approach. Both of them are 
primarily legal approaches, while being intrinsically linked to political economy and 
economics. At the same time, they reproduce the divide found within political economy, as 
the former provide a macro-approach, and the latter a micro-approach, derived respectively 
from methodological collectivism and methodological individualism. The two approaches 
therefore deal with different problem constellations. Ordoliberalism is a legal theory of 
societal ordering, which departs from an understanding of the economy and politics as 
different systemic processes in need of mutual stabilisation through law.
9
 Law and 
economics, on the other hand, remain a toolbox for concrete problem-solving within market-
based economic processes which does not derive an explicit macro perspective on society 
from it micro insights. The objectives guiding the two approaches therefore remain 
fundamentally different, as the latter, in essence, are concerned with questions of allocative 
efficiency, and the former with issues of power and stability in society. Thus, the two 
approaches do not serve as functional equivalents. This is also apparent in the area where the 
two have intersected the most, namely, in EU competition law and policy. The switch from a 
predominantly ordoliberal and legal approach to an economic approach, encapsulated as law 
and economics within the legal dimension of EU competition law and policy, have 
considerably altered the objectives and effects produced by this policy regime.
10
 In a 
simplified form, one might therefore argue that the ordoliberals are interested in the 
connection between political economy and law, while law and economics is interested in the 
connection between economics and law. 
                                                 
8
  See, for example, Wolfgang Streeck, “How to Study Contemporary Capitalism?”, (2012) 53 European 
Journal of Sociology, 1-28. 
9
  Franz Böhm, “Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft”, (1966) 17 ORDO: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung 
von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (hereinafter ORDO), 75-151; Walter Eucken, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung 
und ihre Verwirklichung”, (1949) 2 ORDO, 1-99; Walter Eucken, “Technik, Konzentration und Ordnung der 
Wirtschaft”, (1950) 3 ORDO, 3-17. For a historical and conceptual re-construction of ordoliberalism within 
the broader framework of neo-liberalism see; Thomas Biebricher, The Political Theory of Neoliberalism, 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2019). For the further development of ordoliberalism by Ernst-
Joachim Mestmäcker and the long-term implications for Europe, see, also, the contribution of Christian 
Joerges and Michelle Everson to this volume. 
10
  For more on this, see Dzmitry Bartalevich, “Do Economic Theories Inform Policy? Analysis of the Influence 
of the Chicago School on European Union Competition Policy”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Copenhagen Business 
School, 2017. 
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II. THE LAW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY – A SUB-CASE OF A GRAND 
DEBATE 
The highly divergent assumptions and objectives guiding the various schools of political 
economy and of legal approaches to political economy means that exercises aimed at 
“overcoming the differences” or developing a “unified approach” within the scheme of a 
singular grand theory are likely to be futile. One might, however, fruitfully contextualise the 
existing approaches to law and political economy within the broader social scientific and 
epistemological realm, and position them according to a number of core dimensions. 
II.1.  Holism versus Differentiation 
The grand theories of modern society from Hobbes and Hegel to Leibnitz and Luhmann all 
circulate around a trade-off between holism and differentiation. The diagnosis of society 
provided by such theories is, to a high extent, determined by the theoretical architecture put 
forward, and this architecture is pre-structured by the initial choice made between a holistic- 
or a differentiation-based world view, i.e., between an understanding of society as a whole, 
which is larger than the sum of its parts, or an understanding of society as a mere collection 
of differentiated parts. 
As also observable in the self-descriptions of society, the progressive advancement of 
modernity can be understood as a gradual move away from a holistic notion of society, and 
towards an increased reliance on a differentiation-based notion of society.
11
 Hobbes’ theory 
of the Commonwealth is, at least in the Anglo-American world, often considered the first 
theory of society based upon modern premises. But, although a differentiation between state 
and society is implicit to the theory, its starting-point is, as also illustrated by the famous 
frontispiece of Leviathan, a holistic, i.e., organic, notion of body politics.
12
 In the Hobbesian 
world, there are many bodies in society, but they are all encompassed by the “meta-body” of 
the state in the monarchical form. As such, Hobbes’ theory introduces a modern element but 
never really escape the pre-modern understanding of society as a holistic whole. In a “two 
steps ahead” and “one step back” manner, the history of modern western thought from Locke 
and Montesquieu to Rousseau, Kant and Hegel are the history of the gradual shift - 
sometimes bemoaned and sometimes celebrated - from holism to differentiation. A 
                                                 
11
  Reinhart Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichten, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006); Niklas Luhmann, 
“Gesellchaftliche Struktur und semantische Tradition”, in: idem, Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik, Band 
1, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 9-71. 
12
  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and 
Civil., edited by Ian Shapiro, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2010). 
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movement which culminated in the theory of classical modernity, defined as the époque 
between 1789 and 1989, par excellence, in Hegel’s Philosophy of Rights.
13
 
A substantial degree of uncomfortableness with the modern condition can be detected 
in Rousseau’s communitarian praise of the simple life prior to Hegel. A similar scepticism 
can be found in Kierkegaard’s and Marx’s subsequent critiques of Hegel through their 
explorations of the dark side of modernity by respectively looking at the individualised 
human condition and the implications of economic reproduction. Nonetheless, Hegel’s theory 
was the first which made the structural conditions of modernity, a differentiated and 
temporalised society based upon a linear conception of time, rather than a holistic and static 
society reproduced through a circular notion of time, the explicit foundations for his theory, 
while, at the same time, systematically seeking to address the dark side of modern society by 
introducing a systematic notion of critique.
14
 
The classical modernist narrative, as embodied in the advancements of the Atlantic 
Revolutionary movements, in Europe, North and South America, from the 1770s to the 
1820s,
15
 implied a focus on progress, emancipation and freedom, while the “dark side”, from 
Hegel onwards, has been consistently problematised through terms such as alienation (Marx), 
anomie (Durkheim), colonialisation (Habermas), de-differentiation (Luhmann), 
disciplination (Elias and Foucault), existential fear (Kierkegaard), rationalisation (Weber), 
reification (Adorno and Horkheimer), and technification (Heidegger), upon the basis of what 
ultimately points in the direction of either a longing for, or at least serving as reflections on, 
the consequences of a lost world understood and observed in holistic terms.
16
 
II.2.  Holism and Differentiation in Economics and Political Economy 
Within economics and political economy, a sub-variant of this debate has unfolded. With 
initial skirmishes unfolding from Smith and Ricardo to Hegel and Marx, the defining battle 
emerged with the constitution of economics as a largely self-contained academic discipline in 
                                                 
13
  Georg W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im 
Grundrisse, Werke Band 7, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, [1821] 1970). 
14
  Jürgen Habermas, “Hegels Begriff der Moderne”, in: idem, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, 
(Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985), pp. 34-58. 
15
  Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives, (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2014); Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History, (Pittsburg PA: University of 
Pittsburg Press, 2009). 
16
  Poul F. Kjaer, “The Structural Transformation of Embeddedness”, in: Josef Falke and Christian Joerges 
(eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2011), pp. 85-104, at 89 et seq. See, also, Niklas Luhmann, Paradigm Lost: Über die ethische 
Reflexion der Moral, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990). 
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the switch from the dominance of the German historical school, associated in various ways 
with von Schmoller, Weber, Schumpeter and others, to the analytical, model based, largely 
US-based economic discipline of today. The switch from the “real world”, i.e., history, to 
analytical models is normally considered a switch from holism to differentiation because the 
German historical school ultimately subscribed to a particular holistic inspired philosophy of 
history.
17
 This view, however, is highly questionable. Rather than representing an 
advancement of modernity, analytical economics remain stuck in the past, in so far as the axis 
around which modern economic theories circulates is a notion of “equilibrium” and the idea 
that markets tend towards it. Any notion of equilibrium, or balance, however, pre-supposes a 
whole which can be “in balance”. Contemporary economics is yin and yang science, where 
the whole, i.e., “the market”, is a body which is greater than its parts, i.e., supply and 
demand. This is also expressed by the common day stylisation of the market as a persona 
with autonomous agency, as expressed in statements such as “the market expands”, “the 
market rebounds” or “the market expects”.
18
 
Whereas advanced social theories have shed any notion of equilibrium or balance a 
long time ago, and substituted them with notions of process and evolution, mainstream 
economics remains entrenched in holistic thinking of a seventeenth century origin. This is 
also apparent from its built in bias, which tends to see “society”, rather than the state or any 
other repository of public power, as the central driving force of social development, while, at 
the same time, “society” is factually equalled to the market. Hence, “private” is preferred to 
“public”, and public intervention is only deemed desirable in the unfortunate case of “market 
imperfections”. 
The above, somewhat crude, characterisation of the dominant traits of contemporary 
economics has, of course, been heavily criticised by the political economy discipline, which 
went its own way in the wake of the differentiation of economics from its neighbouring 
disciplines. But, even in contemporary political economy, the critique of “market 
fundamentalism” and the crude world view concerning the nature of economic relations 
which dominates the economic discipline has, however, not implied an abandoning of the 
holistic premise, but merely a substitution of market holism with cultural holism. The Three 
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  Yuichi Shionoya, The Soul of the German Historical School: Methodological Essays on Schmoller, Weber 
and Schumpeter, (New York: Springer Verlag, 2005). 
18
  For a de-construction of the notion of the market, see Geoffrey M. Hodgson, “How Mythical Markets 
Mislead Analysis: An Institutionalist Critique of Market Universalism”, Socio-Economic Review, published 
ahead of print 9 January 2019, available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwy049. 
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Worlds of Welfare Capitalism approach, associated with Gøsta Esping-Andersen, advances, 
as is also apparent from the title, an image of distinct universes of welfare capitalism.
19
 In a 
similar manner, The Varieties of Capitalism literature tends simply to speak of “France”, 
“Germany” or the “United States”, assuming that they are unified and singular entities. From 
this perspective, the state/society distinction does not exist or is at least disregarded in so far 
as the objects of study are ontological pre-supposed and assumed to be “culturally given” 
holistic national units, made up of all social communications unfolding within their 
respective borders and seen as tending to move towards some sort of institutional 
equilibrium.
20
 In the German context, Fritz Scharpf and Wolfgang Streeck have, moreover, 
advanced an implicit culturalistic version of political economy, in which, for example, the 
German political economy, i.e., the German capitalist state, is seen as a unitary and holistic 
system which includes all activities unfolding within the borders of Germany,
21
 or through an 
understanding of the Eurozone as characterised by not only unbridgeable cultural divides, but 
also by static cultures which are essentially resistant to change.
22
 
Due to the deficient conceptual tool boxes at their disposition both market-based 
economics and culturalist political economy are - for theory-constructing reasons - forced 
ontologically to assume the prior existence of some sort of given holistic unity which tends 
towards equilibrium upon the basis of mysterious forces. The essential nature of their 
respective constructions, therefore, only differs to a limited extent, because both types of 
theories lack the conceptual framework which would enable them to go beyond a holistic 
world view. As such, both strands can be understood as based upon foundationalism of an 
essential metaphysical character. Or differently expressed: Mainstream economics and 
political economy share the trait that they have not yet moved into the post-metaphysical 
era.
23
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  Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990). 
20
  Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
21
  Wolfgang Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the German Political Economy, 2nd 
edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
22
  Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Costs of Non-disintegration: The Case of the European Monetary Union”, in: 
Damian Chalmers, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges (eds), The End of the Eurocrats’ Dream: 
Adjusting to European Diversity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 29-49. 
23
  Jürgen Habermas, Nachmetaphysisches Denken, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). An important 
exception can, however, be found by Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop. In their version of cultural political 
economy, analyses of sense- and meaning-making are linked to instituted economic and political relations, 
thereby combining semiotic and structural features without falling into the trap of foundationalism. See 
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The divide between market holism and cultural holism was particularly highlighted in 
the stand-off between Friedrich August von Hayek and Karl Paul Polanyi (Polányi Károly in 
Hungarian) which, to a large extent, continues to dominate contemporary debates on political 
economy.
24
 In 1944, Hayek and Polanyi published The Road to Serfdom and The Great 
Transformation respectively and, in doing so, asked the same question: Why had 
totalitarianism emerged and succeeded?
25
 The answers that they gave were, however, 
diametrically opposed to one another. Hayek’s answer was that the economy had not been 
differentiated enough from the rest of society, i.e., that society had become characterised by 
de-differentiation and a capture of the economy by politics. For Polanyi, the main problem 
was, on the other hand, a society in which the economy had become “too detached” and dis-
embedded from the rest of society. In short, the answers that they gave were yet another 
variation of the holism versus differentiation debate. 
But even though Hayek seemingly opted for differentiation, his theoretical 
construction remained bound up on the ontological idea of the market, simultaneously 
understood as the sum of individual preferences and as a holistic universe in its own right, 
making it into more than the sum of individual preferences. In addition, both of them end up 
with lopsided theoretical constructions characterised by incongruous methodologies aimed at 
comparing “apples and pears”. This is the case because they base their respective conclusions 
upon selective comparisons between empirical realities and highly idealised fictions. By 
Hayek, this is expressed in the comparison that he makes between the spontaneous order of 
the market as a fictional ideal, and the empirical reality of politics as selectively embodied in 
Stalinism and National Socialism. By Polanyi, on the other hand, the focus is on the empirical 
reality of market society, which is conceived of as essentially brutal and which is contrasted 
with the fictional ideal of a holistic and communitarian pre-modern world characterised by 
integrated and harmonic social exchanges.
26
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ngai-Ling Sum and Bob Jessop, Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in its Place in 
Political Economy, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
24
  See, for example, the contributions in (2018) 15 Globalizations, issue 7, special edition, entitled 
“Questioning the Utopian Springs of Market Economy”, guest edited by Damien Cahill, Martijn Konings 
and Adam David Morton, 887-1057. 
25
  Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, [1944] 1994); Karl 
Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, 2nd ed., (Boston MA: 
Beacon Press [1944] 2001). 
26
  An equally skewed reactionary-communitarian version of the Polanyian approach can be found in Wolfgang 
Streeck in his comparison between the real existing capitalist market economy and an ideal vision of 
democracy which, for Streeck, is equal to nationally constituted and embedded left-wing social democracy. 
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Yet another variant of the holism versus differentiation tension can be observed in the 
gradual substitution of the 1970s variant of structural Marxism with structural Liberalism, 
i.e., neoliberalism, as the fashionable ideology of the day, a substitution which, in theoretical 
terms, merely implied a switch from one side to the other of the same coin, in so far as both 
assumed that society could be understood as being predominantly structured by economic 
interests and motivations, and that “society” could be equalled to the economy. Both 
ideologies saw and see the economy and private power, and not the state and public power, as 
the true driving-force of societal evolution, and, for both, state action ultimately remains 
guided by economic interests, leaving little autonomy for public power and law. If one digs 
deep enough behind both world views, one will find a holistic notion of society which is seen 
as the central source of meaning and evolution.
27
 
II.3.  Beyond Holism and Differentiation through Law 
Within law, the holism versus differentiation debate has crystallised in another sub-debate on 
democracy versus rights and republican versus liberal approaches, often historically 
described as a relentless hollowing out of republican values and the rise of rights-based 
liberalism,
28
 and continued attempts to square the circle between the two approaches.
29
 The 
move towards a hollowing out of republican values can be understood as reflecting a 
progressive “self-emptying of power”
30
 through a substitution of politics with law.
31
 Within 
political philosophy, the liberals versus communitarian’s debate of the 1990s might, 
furthermore, be seen as an offspring of the holism versus differentiation perspective on the 
world. 
But, more fundamentally, law can also be seen as the social formation which - at least 
potentially - overcomes the trade-off between holism and differentiation. A central 
contribution of law to the rest of society is form giving, in which a social exchange becomes 
                                                                                                                                                        
For this capitalism versus democracy dichotomy within a nationalist frame, see, for example, Wolfgang 
Streeck, “How will Capitalism End?”, New Left Review, 87, May/June 2014, 35-64. 
27
  Poul F. Kjaer, “Context Construction through Competition: The Prerogative of Public Power, Intermediary 
Institutions and the Expansion of Statehood through Competition”, (2015) 16 Distinktion, 146-66. 
28
  For example, Martin Loughlin, What is Constitutionalisation?, in: Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), 
The Twilight of Constitutionalism?, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 47-69. 
29
  Most notably pursued by Habermas. See Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur 
Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992). 
30
  Jean Clam, “What is Modern Power?”, in: Michael King and Chris Thornhill (eds), Luhmann on Law and 
Politics (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 145-62. 
31
  Franz L. Neumann, “The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society”, in: William E. Scheuerman 
(ed), The Rule of Law Under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, (Berkeley 
CA: University of California Press, [1933] 1996), pp. 101-141. 
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an economic exchange when given legal form and status through instruments such as 
contracts and property rights, and a social exchange becomes a political act when unfolded as 
formal legally-framed decision-making or when relying on legally-constructed citizen rights, 
such as the right to vote, and other constitutional principles. Bridges between different 
spheres of society, such as the economy and politics, are also built through law, as, for 
example, expressed through the legal structuring and constitutional linking of taxation and 
representation. 
In sociological terms, this means that it is through law that the functional 
differentiation of society is given form, in so far as law simultaneously separates and re-
connects the different functional spheres of society. Law, in other words, has the potential to 
ensure the integration of society in a manner which goes beyond the zero-sum holism-versus-
differentiation perspective. It is through law that a self-reflexive loop is established between a 
functional sphere (Hegel/Durkheim), social system (Luhmann) or field (Bourdieu) and the 
rest of society. Or to express it differently, it is through the coupling with law that a social 
system becomes a social system. Methodologically, this has profound consequences, as the 
very object of study becomes law, or, more correctly, the legal form. Following Hans 
Kelsen’s identity thesis, the study of the state, for example, becomes the study of law, in so 
far as the state is the law and vice versa.
32
 If one functional system takes up an overarching 
position in society, in the sense that it has a strategic position which enables it to serve as the 
central framework for the integration of society, it is therefore the legal system, and not the 
political or the economic system, because the legal system is what gives form to modern 
society. Again using the example of statehood, a modern state distinguishes itself from other 
types of ordering through the particular way in which it establishes a coupling with 
autonomous law through constitutional self-binding. The essential point concerning the 
nature of the state and other institutional repositories of political power, (or, in fact, any other 
institutionalised social phenomena) is that states do not and cannot exist outside the law, and 
it is the law which constitutes the state and not the other way around. This is the case because 
there can be “no sovereignty beyond legality”,
33
 or to paraphrase Hannah Arendt, outside the 
                                                 
32
  See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, [1934] 1960), p. 279 et 
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33
  Hauke Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives, (London: Bloomsbury 
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Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives”, (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society, 
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law, there is no power only violence.
34
 As argued by Franz Neumann, political freedom, both 
positively and negatively conceived, is therefore constituted through law, as it is rights, 
political, economic and social, which provide such freedom with its form, hereby, once again, 
underlining the constitutive function of law.
35
 
The Marxist critique of law as an inseparable and constitutive element of capitalism is 
therefore both right and wrong. There is, indeed, no economy without law, and law is, indeed, 
intrinsic to economic reproduction.
36
 But law is also intrinsic to all other institutionalised 
social formations. Modern political power, for example, is, as already indicated, legally-
constituted power.
37
 But even more important, the modern version of this form-giving 
function of law established through simultaneous separation and re-connection of the 
functional spheres of society did not emerge from the dialectical stand-off between the 
economy and political power, but instead from the tension between religion and political 
power. The modern world emerged as an outcome of the tenth and eleventh century 
Investiture Controversy between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. Modernity started 
with the central outcome of this Controversy, namely, the simultaneous differentiation and 
coupling of religion and law, giving religion, within the framework of the Church, a specific 
legal form. In short, the basic legal infrastructure of modern society was developed in the 
stand-off between politics and religion, and not in the stand-off between politics and the 
economy.
38
 Later differentiations and couplings, such as the also legally-mediated distinction 
between the economy and politics, as expressed in the law of political economy, are just 
variations of this first modern distinction. In the same manner as the emerging sovereign state 
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à la Bodin and Hobbes was an imitation of the Kingdom of God,
39
 the law of political 
economy is based upon re-cycled material emerging from the law of religion. 
The breakthrough of modernity, at the time of the Atlantic Revolutions, implied a 
gradual shift of focus from religion to the economy, a development which, however, 
advanced slower than is often assumed, with the real shift only taking place in the first half of 
the twentieth century, a shift which, especially in the European context, has so far played out 
in three different institutional formations: those associated with the “turn to corporatism” in 
the interwar period, the “turn to neo-corporatism” in immediate the post-WWII era, and the 
“turn to governance” since the late 1970s. All these shifts implied a re-calibration of the 
function and status of law in general, and the law of political economy in particular. These 
shifts, as will become apparent below, might also be seen as different ways of approaching 
the relation between hierarchy and spontaneity in society through law, thereby providing an 
historical-empirical counterpart to the conceptual-theoretical distinction between holism and 
differentiation. 
III. THE “TURN TO CORPORATISM” AND THE SUSPENSION OF LAW
40
 
Contrary to popular perception, the factual realisation of the idea of legally-constituted 
modern public power resting on legally-constituted public sovereignty, which was advanced 
in the context of the Atlantic Revolutions, was a rather protracted affair.
41
 Conglomerate 
quasi-feudal empires with strong privatistic and multi-level features, rather than nation states, 
to which the characteristics of modern legally-constituted public power were attached, 
remained the dominant form of statehood on the European continent right up to the implosion 
of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian, German, Ottoman and Russian empires in the wake 
of WWI. It was not until this point in time that modern nation statehood became the 
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paradigmatic form of legal organisation in (continental) Europe.
42
 With Czechoslovakia an 
important exception, the Central and Eastern states succeeding the continental empires all 
succumbed to different degrees of authoritarianism within a decade of their formation,
43
 just 
as the democratic state of law inherent to modern statehood eroded or came under severe 
pressure throughout the rest of Europe as well.
44
 This breakdown of legally-constituted public 
power was intrinsically linked to the “turn to corporatism” which unfolded throughout 
interwar Europe and which became the manifestation of the law of political economy. 
Drawing on earlier institutional formations, mostly related to the guilds and corresponding 
ideological articulations,
45
 a diverse and multi-faceted string of corporatist institutional 
formations and corresponding ideological movements gained momentum in the years 
following WWI, manifesting themselves in reactionary, totalitarian and progressive formats. 
The term “corporatism” became the word of the day, gaining a level of popularity 
comparable with the popularity of the term “governance” today, while also maintaining a 
similar illusive and catch-all character.
46
 Factually, corporatism gained different institutional 
expressions in different national settings, from Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy to 
Spain, which all subsequently turned to authoritarianism or totalitarianism, at the same time 
that corporatism also gained considerable influence in democratic settings from France to The 
Netherlands and from Scandinavia to the United Kingdom.
47
 
In spite of its multi-faceted character, a number of core and shared features of 
corporatism, which were shared across ideological and national boundaries, can be distilled: 
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1) A holistic focus on “society” in its entirety derived from an understanding of 
society as an organic body, rather than a focus on the state or other 
institutional repositories of public power. Overcoming the distinction between 
the public and private dimensions of society was, therefore, at the forefront of 
corporatist development; 
2) A sectorial outlook, in praxis representing an in-built contradiction to the 
holistic outlook, emphasising the organisation of society along functional lines 
upon the basis of interest representation; 
3) A rejection of the rule of law and legal formalism, since law and legal 
instruments came to be seen as a hindrance to efficient and goal-orientated 
planning and political action. 
In general theoretical terms, corporatism can also be understood as reflecting a 
rejection of the spontaneous dimension of social processes and their substitution with planned 
and organised processes. Most functionally-differentiated areas of society are characterised 
by a duality between hierarchically organised and spontaneously co-ordinated areas, as, for 
example, expressed in the distinction between firms and the market, the political system and 
public opinion, and between institutionalised religious congregations and their believers.
48
 It 
was precisely this duality which came under attack through the corporatist intention to 
substitute spontaneous processes, including, but not only, market-based processes, with 
hierarchical structures which relied on organisation and planning. Not surprisingly, price 
control, rather than free price formation and competition on the market, thus became a key 
aspect of the economic dimension of corporatism.
49
 In its economic dimension, cartelisation 
thus became, at both national and transnational level, the dominant concrete organisational 
and legal form of corporatism.
50
 This move to cartelisation factually implied the emergence 
of hybrid structures which cut across the public/private divide, allowing both the intrusion of 
states into the economy and an inclusion of private actors into public policy. Corporatism 
thus reflected, as, for example, was apparent in Weimar Germany, both an opening of the 
private realm to a high level of arbitrary state intervention, as well as a factual (re-) 
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privatisation of public power as informal networks, most notably from industry, which, de 
facto, became an institutional actor of the state.
51
 
Moreover, this factual suspension of the public/private distinction was, as indicated, 
connected to a more fundamental rejection of the rule of law. This rejection of law, which 
was taken to an extreme in Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany, implied a dismissal 
of the modern form of statehood and legally-constituted public power. As argued by 
Neumann, focusing on developments in the German context, the consequence was not only a 
strongly cartelised economy and a more general eradication of the separation between the 
state and the rest of society, but also the disappearance of the state, and, with it, the realm of 
public power. A state is constituted through the legal distinction between the state and the rest 
of society, and the dissolution of the distinction therefore also implies the dissolution of the 
state. In the German case, this process had already begun during the WWI through the 
introduction of a corporatist war economy, and gradually became more entrenched during the 
Weimar years, reaching its climax during the National Socialist regime. Rather than a “strong 
state”, National Socialism became characterised by a particular form of “totalitarian 
pluralism” in which the notion of statehood had lost its meaning, as both the formal and 
factual distinction between the state and the rest of society had disappeared altogether.
52
 
Alternatively, one can, as argued by Ernst Fraenkel, speak of a “dual state”, since the legal 
system, continued partly as a “normative state” (Normenstaat) and partly as a “prerogative 
state” (Maßnahmenstaat), with the latter allowing for a continuation of social exchanges 
within the economy and other segments of society, for example, through the enforcement of 
contracts, while the latter instrumentalised the law, deploying legal instruments as a tool both 
in and for the advancement of arbitrary political objectives and for the suppression of 
resistance to the regime.
53
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IV.  THE “TURN TO NEO-CORPORTISM – SEPARATION AND RE-
CONNECTION THROUGH LAW 
Against the background of the interwar experience, de-cartelisation and a competition-based 
market economy gained a central strategic status in the post-war European order, becoming 
central pillars of a new paradigm of the law of political economy. As already mentioned, 
Hayek and Polanyi simultaneously developed theories concerned with why totalitarian 
regimes had emerged but arrived at diametrically-opposed conclusions in so far as the former 
argued that the problem was “too little”, and the latter “too much”, market and competition. 
In sociological terms, their respective positions can also be seen as focused upon whether the 
existence or the absence of a functionally-differentiated society was the underlying reason for 
the emergence of totalitarianism. For Neumann, competition furthermore emerged as one of 
the “four Ds” which subsequently became the pillar of the US-American occupation strategy 
in Germany: de-nazification, democratisation, de-militarisation, and finally de-cartelisation.
54
 
While not sharing Hayek’s general stance on society and its central driving forces, as well as 
avoiding market holism, Neumann decisively opted for a functional differentiation approach, 
in so far as his central point was that de-differentiation between economic and political 
processes due to a suspension of generalised formal law was a central reason for the 
breakdown of the Weimar Republic. As such, he admitted a central strategic role to law as the 
framework which is aimed at simultaneously separating and re-connecting economic and 
political processes. Inspired by US anti-trust policy, he came to see competition law and 
policy as a central instrument not only aimed at framing economic processes, but also aimed 
at preventing concentrations of resources and private power to a degree which enabled 
economic actors to exercise influence over or to undermine the autonomy of the political 
system. Neumann, in other words, granted competition law constitutional status, seeing it as a 
core pillar of the constitutional order. 
Neumann’s stance was unfolded within a wider ideological debate on the 
compatibility between the rule of law and the emerging welfare state.
55
 The evolutionary 
answer was a double movement oriented at establishing institutional structures which served 
the dual function of internally stabilising functional, de-limitated spheres such as the 
economy, health, education, science, and religion, and providing frameworks for the 
compatibility between these spheres. This cluster of arrangements has traditionally been 
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denoted as “neo-corporatist”, although it has, in fact, essentially nothing in common with 
earlier forms of corporatism. Although considerable variation can be observed,
56
 the welfare-
state conglomerates which emerged in Western Europe in the post-war period shared the 
feature that they had formal organisation and formalised positivist law as their key 
organisational components, and, as such, they were directly opposed to the core 
organisational ideal which had driven inter-war corporatism. Neo-corporatist structures are 
characterised by hierarchically-organised “peak-associations” serving as negotiation systems 
(Verhandlungssysteme)
57
 which mediate between the different spheres of society, most 
notably, but not exclusively, between the economy and the political system in the state form, 
with the objective of establishing mutual stabilisation of exchanges between the spheres in 
question.
58
 What we, in mainstream language, have come to understand as nation states, 
rather take the form of configurational webs, which are mainly established at the level of 
organisations and regimes, in so far as the “higher order” of nation states emerged through a 
mutual stabilisation of expectations and exchanges between multiple social spheres. Formal 
organisation became the form through which internal order was established within 
functionally-delineated areas, just as they came to serve as the “contact points” for inter-
systemic exchange between, for example, national organised science, education, religion, 
health, mass media, economy, and politics. The consequence is that a particular form of 
second order politics emerged. The internal form of stabilisation within functional spheres 
became a question which was channelled into formalised, often profession-based, 
organisational arrangements, which produced collectively-binding decisions or the functional 
equivalents to collective decisions within their respective functional areas. It follows that a 
successful national configuration neither operates upon the basis of a total subordination of 
society to the modern form of political power in the state form, nor in a form in which the 
political only resides in the state. Rather, a certain gradualisation of the political can be 
observed, in the sense that some linkages between the state-based form of the political- and 
non-state-based forms remained tighter than others, just as the internal degree of hierarchy 
within the non-state forms differed from societal area to societal area.
59
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In this context, competition, especially within its ordoliberal variant, gained a specific 
function as the internal form of ordering within the economy. As pointed out by Foucault, 
this, however, had little to do with laissez-faire liberalism, in so far as competition became 
institutionalised and formalised as an objective, and its realisation became the task of an 
“active policy” and “governmental art”.
60
 Consequently, the market and the state are not just 
in need of separation, but also in need of re-connection, in so far as “pure competition” can 
only be produced through “governmentality”. Especially in the German context, the form of 
this relationship was, however, essentially a legal one. The intervention of the state in the 
structuring of economic exchanges was based upon ordoliberal ideas, at least ideally, and 
based upon a double movement aimed at simultaneously separating and re-connecting of the 
economy and politics through law. Thus, the objective was to maintain functional 
differentiation while re-integrating the economy and politics within a specific form. This 
gives, much neglected by Foucault, law a strategic position as the form through which 
expectations are stabilised, and exchanges and transfers take place between the economy and 
the political system in the state form. Foucault furthermore indicates that the structuring of 
the market becomes the overriding purpose of the state. While structuring the market indeed 
is a central function of the political system in the state form, this view probably under-
estimates the orientation of the state towards its own reproduction and the expansion of state 
power as well as the general function reproduced by states vis-à-vis society in its entirety.
61
 
The constitutional coupling of law and politics is aimed at establishing the general 
convergence of the time structures of society and this is the central integrative contribution of 
states to society.
62
 The convergence between the market and rest of society is just one 
dimension of this as the “state-complex” of law and politics constitutes a common context 
through the structuring of relations and the convergence of time between a whole string of 
social spheres and regimes. This is also reflected in the societal reality of most post-war 
European settings, in so far as areas such as science, health, and education remained largely 
excluded from the market and were, instead, structured upon the basis of an ideal of 
professional autonomy. Like the market, this sort of autonomy was characterised by a dual 
                                                                                                                                                        
Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo (eds), The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of 
Functional Differentiation, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011), pp. 395-430. 
60
  Foucault, La naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au collège de France 1978-1979, note 52 above, p. 121 et 
seq. 
61
  Poul F. Kjaer, “Context Construction through Competition: The Prerogative of Public Power, Intermediary 
Institutions and the Expansion of Statehood through Competition”, (2015) 16 Distinktion, 146-66. 
62
  Niklas Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993), p. 427 et seq. 
Poul F. Kjaer 
 20
set-up, simultaneously emphasising their self-regulatory nature and their reliance on an 
external legal basis provided by the state. Thus, in North Western Europe, the post-war 
period was marked by a massive strengthening of competition as an institutionalised form in 
relation to economic production processes and a simultaneous, legally structured, limitation 
of competition to the economic sphere, which enabled the establishment of the political 
system in the state form to stabilise itself as the “first among equals” within the larger 
conglomerate of the laterally-related institutional regimes which make up the nation state. 
Thus, also the so-called golden-age nation-state was not reflecting an outright state-centred 
society. What, in layman’s language, is understood as the nation state should therefore rather 
be understood as considerably more complex configuration, in which the horizontal nature of 
relations between the state and other spheres of society remained a central feature, at the 
same time as the political-legal complex took up a strategically central position, enabling it to 
engage with other societal dimensions in an asymmetric manner.
63
 
V.  THE “TURN TO GOVERNANCE” – BEYOND THE FORM OF LAW 
As a response to the “turn to corporatism” and totalitarianism, Western Europe underwent a 
profound dual (trans-) national re-constitution process in the immediate post-WWII period, 
which implied a re-invigoration of public power within a neo-corporatist framework.
64
 
Together with Les Trente Glorieuses and the Wirtschaftswunder, this development provided 
for the expectation that Western Europe had finally arrived in modernity. However, since the 
1970s, this has gradually changed due to a “return of crisis”,
65
 as embodied in the stagnation 
crisis of the 1970s and the possibly interconnected financial crisis which became visible in 
2007.
66
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It was in the context of this prolonged crisis trajectory that the “turn to governance” 
gradually unfolded from the 1970s onwards. As was the case with the “turn to corporatism”, 
the emergence of the governance phenomenon has a dual character which is reflected in 
concrete institutional transformations, as well as in discursive articulations of particular 
intentions. The concept furthermore remains as multi-faceted and elusive as the concept of 
corporatism, thereby depriving it of the status of a legal concept in the strict sense.
67
 In terms 
of origin, two different strands can be detected. One mainly has nation-state origins and was 
closely associated with the introduction of New Public Management and concordant policies 
associated with the de-centralisation, privatisation and de-regulatory and re-regulatory reform 
programmes which took shape from the 1970s onwards. In terms of scholarly origin, this 
strand can furthermore be considered a further development of the theories of steering 
developed in the 1970s.
68
 Another strand refers to transnational regimes centred on public 
international organisations such as the World Bank, the original creator of the concept, and 
public international organisations, such as the IMF and the OECD, and, of course, the EU.
69
 
A common core of the various strands, however, shows certain affinities with the 
characteristics previously highlighted in relation to the “turn to corporatism”: 
1. A holistic focus on “society”, rather than the state or other institutional 
repositories of public power. This implies an explicit intention to cut across 
the public/private divide, thereby undermining the distinction between state 
and society or equivalent distinctions between institutional repositories of 
public power and the rest of society. “Society as such”, rather than 
institutional realms of public power, thereby gains the front seat, being seen as 
both the object and the subject of policy-making, while, at the same time, 
“society” de facto is equalled to the “economy”; 
2. A sectorial outlook at policy-making and legal regimes along functional lines, 
thereby making it closely aligned with the tendency towards the increased 
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fragmentation of legal ordering. As such, the governance phenomenon is also 
characterised by a fundamental in-built contradiction as it simultaneously 
refers to society in its entirety and furthers the fragmentation of that society. 
3. Instead of a focus on the decision-making processes themselves, the focus is 
externalised through an emphasis on output and efficiency, giving it a strong 
economistic touch.
70
 The consequence is a pragmatic emphasis on decision-
making and the impact of decision-making, paying less attention to the formal 
legal structuring of decision-making and associated issues of accountability. 
Governance, therefore, implies a turn to informality which goes against the 
ethos of legal formalism.
71
 
The fundamental difference between interwar corporatism and contemporary 
governance, therefore, seems to be the difference in normative intention, as corporatism, in 
essence, was about the constitution of a society-based political community unrestrained by 
formality and law, while governance is about the amelioration of economic efficiency 
through a loosening of the perceived grip of law and the “red tape” of government regulation 
on the market or on market-mimicking social processes. Or, to put it in more abstract terms, 
whereas corporatism implied a dismissal of the spontaneous dimension of social processes 
and a re-enforcement of the hierarchical dimension, governance is aimed at ameliorating the 
spontaneous dimension and a downgrading of the hierarchical dimension. Governance, in 
other words, turns the intentions of corporatism upside down. But, at the same time, the two 
discourses share the focus on “society”, rather than the realm of public power, as their core 
object, just as they share the turn to informality and the downgrading of law, essentially 
dismissing the view that law provides the core infrastructure for the structuration of social 
exchanges and the integration of society. Or expressed differently: governance is corporatism 
turned upside down. 
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VI.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME 
The holism versus differentiation and hierarchy versus spontaneity dimensions of the law of 
political economy highlighted above in relation to various historical phases do not and are not 
intended to provide a complete picture which gives justice to the many facets of law’s 
dealings with political economy. It does, however, set some overall parameters which the 
other contributions to this volume relate to in various ways. The book is divided into four 
sections with the first one, in combination with this introductory chapter, setting the scene in 
a theoretical and conceptual sense. This is followed by a global outlook and then a zooming 
in on European developments before, in the final session, the dimensions of a new law of 
political economy are outlined. 
The three contributions in the first section challenge the concept of governance and 
the concept of constitutionalisation, two of the most central prominent concepts of the last 
decades, arguing that both are “totalising” concepts which do not recognise the existence of 
an outside world. 
In the first section, Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson re-construct the largely 
Germany-centred debate on economic constitutionalism. This is done through a contrasting of 
the ordoliberal vision of Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, which greatly influenced the early 
decades of the European integration process, with the “alternative economic law” 
(Alternatives Wirtschaftsrecht) of Rudolf Wiethölter which was explicitly developed as a 
critique of ordoliberalism upon the basis of the idea an international ordre public. Joerges and 
Everson link up with this vision and engage in the development of a revised conflict-law 
perspective in the current European constellation, seeing it as a possible route out of the crisis 
of the last decade through an attempt to safeguard the proprium of law within that 
constellation. 
In the following chapter, Emilios Christodoulidis exposes what he calls the myth of 
democratic governance, the idea that the move to flexible, decentralised, informal soft law 
modes of co-ordination provides an alternative to classical representative democracy. Rather, 
the turn to governance has facilitated a cutting adrift of the economy from political processes 
and the installation of the market principle as the central guarantor of both public interests 
and individual freedom, and has done so in a way which factually underlined the 
public/private divide and the concurrent distinction between public and private law. As such, 
the turn to governance implies the installation of the hegemony of market thinking which has 
no outside and thereby extends to all aspects of society. 
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Duncan Kennedy follows suit by arguing that law has become instrumentalised, used 
as a weapon aimed at striking down ideological adversaries. The progressive moves towards 
juridification, judicialisation and constitutionalisation of the contemporary legal order are 
seen in this light, as they reflect attempts to install a singular perspective as the higher and 
hegemonic order. The political economy of law is thus reflected in the continued attempts of 
collectivities that share material and ideological interests to constitutionalise their particular 
version of the common good. According to Kennedy, drawing mainly on US-American 
developments, the consequence of this development is a politicisation of the judiciary, a 
hollowing out of its claim to impartiality and the destruction of the faith in the methodology 
of law. 
After the sobering contributions of the first section, the attention in the next session is 
turned to developments in the global political economy and the role of law in this context. 
David Kennedy take issue with the hereto dominant perspectives on law and global 
political economy which have seen law as an ordering device aimed at introducing stability 
into the global political and economic systems while promoting peace, justice and prosperity. 
Instead, he suggests turning the focus to the law’s constitutive role in the continued 
reproduction of injustice and inequality. Much like Duncan Kennedy, in the domestic US 
American setting, David Kennedy foregrounds the role of law in political and economic 
struggles in the global setting, recognising law as an instrument and weapon deployed in 
distributive struggles. 
A clear example of this role of law is revealed in the following chapter in which 
Isabel Feichtner explores the law’s role in the distribution and exploitation of natural 
resources, and the link between natural resource extraction and the financialisation of the 
global economy. She explores which bodies of norms shape the political economy of resource 
extraction, including norms of jurisdiction, ownership and use rights, and the justifications 
that accompany these norms of allocation, arguing that law has an in-built exploitation bias 
with respect to natural resource extraction, and that this bias has profound distributive effects. 
Through a historical re-construction, she furthermore shows how this bias and related booms 
and busts in natural resource extraction are intrinsically linked to expansions in the 
financialisation of the economy. 
Jaye Ellis adds another dimension by reminding us that a global perspective on the 
law of political economy necessitates an explicit anthropocenic view which takes the 
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ecological impact of the law of political economy into account. Observing the current state of 
global law, she argues that political economy in the anthropocene remains dominated by 
cognitive instruments and practices, such as standards and indicators which are conditioned 
on scientific input and mainly operate though managerial governance, rather than law. 
However, she argues that legal norms have the potential to play a central role in the 
translation and condensation of scientific insights into components which are actionable in 
the political economy, thereby highlighting the form-giving function of law. 
As becomes apparent in the following section, the global context of law and political 
economy provides a frame for observing European developments as well. Due to the 
particular intensity of transnational legal developments in the European context and the long 
standing European attempts to theorise the different aspects of the relationship between law 
and political economy, Europe might be seen as a particularly well-suited location for 
observing both factual as well as scholarly developments pertaining to the law of political 
economy. 
Hans Micklitz sets the scene by establishing a link between the present “Copenhagen 
book” and the 1989 “Bremen book” entitled Critical Legal Thought: An American-German 
Debate.
72
 A substantial, though far from total, overlap exists among the contributors to the 
two volumes, allowing for a highlighting of the continuities and discontinuities of the past 
thirty years. Departing from a critical legal studies (CLS) perspective on the transformation 
of private law in the European context, he highlights how CLS scholars themselves became 
central actors in the attempt to construct a European internal market with a social face. This 
endeavour has, however, been challenged through the consecutive changes in the function 
and status of law within the European integration process, as it has metamorphosed from 
“integration through law” to “integration through governance” and to “integration beyond 
law”. 
Marija Bartl follows suit with a re-construction of the ideational imaginaries about 
economy and market which unfolds within European private law. By zooming in on 
European consumer law in particular, she re-constructs how different concepts and 
imaginaries of market and economy have shaped the integration project over the last thirty 
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years. The transformation observed is essentially one which goes from the attempt to balance 
market- and non-market-based social formations to an attempt to optimise markets though 
deepened competition and marketisation. A transformation which is based upon a re-
naturalisation of the idea of the market and the idea of the market as the preferred and most 
efficient form of resource allocation. 
Within EU competition law, Jotte Mulder detects a similar transformation as the one 
observed by Bartl in consumer law. The cartel prohibition, in particular, has undergone a 
transformation which implies a structural shift which increasingly favours the demand side 
(consumers) over the supply side (producers). This development has been greatly accelerated 
since the modernisation and economisation of competition law at the turn of the millennium, 
which has curtailed the ability of Member States to take non-economic concerns into account. 
Mulder illustrates this in relation to the Commission’s approach to liberal professions and 
provides two cases on ecological and environmental sustainability in The Netherlands. 
Stefano Giubboni shifts the focus to labour law, highlighting the deeply ambivalent 
relation between labour law and capitalism, a relationship partly characterised by antagonism 
and partly by labour laws central role in enabling capitalist reproduction. This ambivalence, 
he argues, has been re-inforced in the European context over the past three decades due to a 
fundamental transformation in the way in which European integration impacts upon national 
labour law systems. Through the “internal market”-linked turn to governance, and 
subsequently through the economic and financial governance regime of the Euro, the EU 
have moved away from safeguarding national autonomy in relation to labour law, thereby 
factually undermining such autonomy. This is particularly the case after the outbreak and 
expansion of the European debt crisis from 2009 onwards. The result has been the surge of 
“populist” and “‘sovereignist” counter-movements throughout Europe. 
The current state of both the global and the European political economy is marred by 
uncertainty and an erosion, possibly even an outright breakdown, of the institutional set-up 
put in place to stabilise economic and political exchanges. The massive transformations that 
have unfolded over the last four decades - as outlined in the previous chapters - seem to have 
led to a dead-end or cul-de-sac in the form of an ideational and institutional exhaustion. 
Against this background, the final section takes up the creative task of reflecting on the 
possibility of a new law of political economy, its features, its purpose and its form. 
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Karl-Heinz Ladeur starts out with a radical proposal to go beyond hierarchical “top-
down law” based upon a doctrine of delegation and replacing it with “serial law”, which 
consists of temporalised experimental search processes characterised by ex post, rather than 
ex ante, control, a type of law-making which, he argues, can furthermore emerge from private 
and hybrid public/private sources, and rely on complex constellations of networked contracts, 
rather than pure public sources. Such a law, he argues, will correspond far more to the reality 
in which we now live, i.e., a networked and fluid society characterised by data flows, social 
media, and rapid expansions in advanced technology. 
Rodrigo Vallejo follows suit by unfolding a proposal for an understanding of current 
developments in relation to private regulation as amounting to the emergence of a private 
administrative law. Contrasting American and European approaches to private regulation, he 
argues that European rules of recognition concerning private regulation amount to a doctrinal 
construction containing institutional, formal and substantial dimensions. Thus, a new model 
of the law of political economy aimed a containing political economy struggles within the 
structural reality in which they unfold is emerging. 
Lars Viellechner goes a step further by exploring the metamorphosis of 
constitutionalism, and in particular, the emergence of institutions of fundamental rights both 
within the transnational sphere and within “private law”-based formations. Viellechner 
observes a double transformation of law: first an expansion of traditional international law 
into areas which traditionally have not or have only very slightly been touched upon by 
international law, such as environmental law, and certain aspects of criminal law and human 
rights law. Second, the emergence of contract-based transnational governance arrangements, 
such as the one guiding the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), arrangements which, he argues, are based upon a new approach to the horizontal 
effect of constitutional rights which is capable of addressing the legitimacy demands of such 
transnational private arrangements. 
Gunther Teubner generalises the above reflections by advancing a vision of rights as 
not only individual rights but also as trans-subjective rights of communicative, collective, and 
institutional formations in the both the public and the private sphere. As such, Teubner argues 
for a radical expansion of law, allowing it to capture societal processes which are currently 
beyond its reach. In addition, the focus of rights needs to be expanded not only to focus on 
protection from the logics of politics in the form of state activity, but also from the logics of 
the economy and other societal dynamics. The expansion and transformation of the forms of 
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economic reproduction as well as the intensification of other societal processes needs, in 
other words, to be addressed through a corresponding expansion and transformation of law. 
In sum, the volume can be seen as providing a conceptual framework for the study of 
the law of political economy, a diagnosis of the current state of affairs within world society 
and specifically in Europe as well as outlining a vision for new law capable of encapsulating 
the future. 
